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The Greek government is currently attempting to negotiate a deal with other Eurozone states over
the country’s debt. Joshua Aizenman writes on the approach of Germany throughout the crisis. He
argues that the German government’s perspective is best characterised as a form of ‘muddling
through’, whereby stronger action to solve the Eurozone’s instability is only advocated when
Germany’s domestic priorities become threatened. He states that greater willingness for debt
concessions tied to deeper structural reforms, as well as more aggressive policies aimed at hitting
the ECB’s declared two per cent inﬂation target, would oﬀer the best route out of the crisis.
From the get-go, the formation of the Eurozone was driven more by the political vision of its founding fathers than by
an economic cost-beneﬁt analysis. The economic gains from ‘maturing’ the EU into a monetary union were
overhyped, ignoring the questionable assessment of these gains by prominent non-European economists.
Yet, not all problematic marriages should be terminated – while the formation of the Eurozone was probably a
mistake, dissolving the Eurozone now may be another, possibly even costlier mistake. Putting the Eurozone crisis in
its proper historical context, the euro area is a ‘baby union’ facing its ﬁrst maturing crisis. This process is painful, as
has been the learning process for other unions.
The Eurozone: time for Germany to lead?
The presumption in the 1990s was that adopting the euro would provide a more symmetric structure to Europe and
contain the fear of German hegemony. The 2006 speech by Otmar Issing, former Chief Economist and Member of
the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, entitled “The euro as a currency without a state”, exempliﬁed
the buoyant assessment of Eurozone achievements at that time, while ignoring the gathering risks
These risks materialised shortly after the ten-year
anniversary of the Eurozone, which was marked by a
celebration of the single currency’s ‘achievements’.
Today, the euro remains a currency without a state,
under the growing dominance of Germany: a country
that might stabilise the Eurozone if it avoids shirking
its growing responsibility for the euro’s future. This
would require Germany to invest more in upgrading
Eurozone institutions and balancing its substantial
gains with the economic and political responsibilities
that come with them.
Indeed, the challenges associated with managing the
growing fragility of the euro may induce a reluctant
Germany to face a stark trade-oﬀ: the vibrant growth
of Germany, while running large current account
surpluses under a pegged exchange rate with the
other Eurozone countries, may come to an abrupt
end if the Eurozone unravels. Germany has not yet been exposed to the full costs of the macro straightjacket
associated with the euro.
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The economic beneﬁts of the Eurozone to Germany, as well as to Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS)
were frontloaded. The boom experienced in GIIPS countries in the ﬁrst decade of the Eurozone was magniﬁed by
the economic strength of the Eurozone core, the under regulation of borrowing by private banks and states, and by
the so called issue of ‘moral hazard’ – the conjecture that the growing costs of unwinding the euro will induce
bailouts further down the road.
The Eurozone crisis forced the GIIPS countries to confront the costs of their earlier, excessive borrowing. In
contrast, beyond the growing balance-sheet exposure of its ﬁnancial system, Germany has not yet been fully
exposed to the downside risk of higher unemployment and lower growth that has already hit most of the Eurozone
countries. While there is no doubt about the relative eﬃciency of the German labour market, it has also beneﬁted
from the advantage of running a sizable current account surplus under a ﬁxed exchange rate with its Eurozone
counterparts. Germany’s resilience and dominant size within the EU may explain its ‘muddling-through’ approach
towards the Eurozone crisis – doing enough to prevent the unravelling of the Eurozone, while resisting policies that
may mitigate the depth of the crisis if they involve short-run costs to Germany.
A manifestation of this approach is the asymmetric deﬂationary bias of the ECB’s inﬂation targeting, a policy akin to
targeting Germany’s inﬂation rather than targeting inﬂation for the whole of the Eurozone. This deﬂationary bias
induced debt deﬂation, pushing the Eurozone toward a Japanese style ‘lost decade’.Another manifestation of
Germany’s muddling-through approach is the prevalent German view that its persistent current account surplus is a
reﬂection of the country’s eﬃciency and is independent of the adjustment challenges facing the global economy, the
Eurozone, and the countries in the Eurozone periphery.
Yet, at times of global deﬂationary pressure, global employment is not a zero sum game — higher investment and
lower saving in any large surplus country would help in mitigating global protectionist threats and underemployment
pressures. Ironically, Germany’s attitude toward the Eurozone resembles the attitude of the United States toward the
Bretton Woods system in the 1960s – benign neglect of the growing tensions, which led to the ultimate demise of
the system, while the new (i.e. Richard Nixon’s) U.S. government “took no initiative to do anything about the
monetary turmoil as long as it did not see its domestic priorities endangered by the market”. The chances are that
unravelling the Eurozone would be much more costly than the end of the Bretton Woods regime.
The growing clout of Germany in the Eurozone put the country in the role of agenda setter, having the capacity to
facilitate the convergence towards a deeper ﬁnancial union. Yet, such a convergence requires paying greater
attention to the growing cost of debt overhang. This concern applies well beyond the GIIPS countries’ external
borrowing: by now most Eurozone countries are burdened by the total debt overhang (private and public)
approaching or exceeding twice their GDPs, increasing the drag on economic growth at times of deﬂationary and
austerity policies.
European history during the 20th Century has vividly illustrated the economic and political risks of debt overhang –
the post WWI Treaty of Versailles  imposed a large debt overhang on Germany, ignoring Keynes’ concerns in his
The Economic Consequences of the Peace manifesto, destroying down the road Germany’s middle class, at
Europe’s peril. In contrast, the post WWII policies allowed Germany and Western Europe faster recovery by avoiding
trapping Europe into another debt overhang cycle.
Looking forward, the risk of pushing Eurozone countries further on the wrong side of the debt ‘ Laﬀer curve’ would be
mitigated by a greater willingness for debt concessions tied to deeper structural reforms, as well as more aggressive
policies aimed at hitting the ECB’s declared two per cent inﬂation target. Such a big push is needed in order to
terminate the risky and aimless muddling through, on the way towards a more stable Euro-Union. It is better for
Germany to assert leadership than for the country to be forced to act.
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of the London School of Economics.
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